Political Corruption and Scandals in Japan by Matthew M. Carlson & Steven R. Reed

Author:Matthew M. Carlson & Steven R. Reed [Carlson, Matthew M. & Reed, Steven R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: History, Asia, Japan, Social History, Political Science, Political Process, General, World, Asian, Corruption & Misconduct, Social Science, Sociology
ISBN: 9781501715679
Google: YjFEDwAAQBAJ
Amazon: 1501715658
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2018-03-14T18:30:00+00:00

LDP Policy Tribesmen (Zoku Giin)

In Japan “policy tribesmen” (zoku giin) play the role of mediating between politicians and bureaucrats (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987). The bureaucracy took charge of Japan’s economic development from the time the LDP was formed in 1955 until the 1973 oil shock (Nikkei Weekly, 10 January 1994).¹ In the next two decades, LDP zoku giin emerged and expanded their influence as the government’s budget grew smaller and conflicts between ministries surfaced. The bureaucracy became dependent on these politicians, which led to corruption, poor policy decisions, and inappropriate budget allocations.

Zoku giin serve in many official party and governmental positions related to a ministry, but their influence was based on their long association and personal networks, not their formal authority. The informal influence of zoku giin often trumps the formal authority of cabinet ministers. We owe a debt to the maverick Tanaka Makiko for providing us with our clearest evidence concerning the relationship between ministers, bureaucrats, and zoku giin. In her two stints in ministerial roles, she tried to exercise the legal powers of ministers and failed. These failures revealed the practical limitations on ministerial power. We begin with her second stint in the cabinet as minister of education in the Noda administration.

Tanaka was presented with a document that would approve the establishment of several new universities. It seemed perfectly clear to her that Japan needed to reduce the number of universities, not establish new ones, so she refused her approval. Uproar ensued. The problem was that the universities had already been built, faculty hired, curriculums set, and advertisements for students published. Though the minister had clear legal authority to make the decision, Tanaka’s choice set was not the “either approve or disapprove,” as indicated by the law, but either acquiesce in what has been decided or cause trouble and delay the implementation of what had been decided. Tanaka soon relented, making her point (and several more enemies) but only slightly delaying the start of the new universities. Most ministers simply acquiesce in any decision that reaches their desk. When a maverick like Tanaka bucks the system, it becomes possible to glimpse how the system works.

To have effective influence over the decisions made by the ministry, politicians need to be involved much earlier in the process. Ministers can and do have pet projects and do have great influence over that project when they become ministers. But the politicians with the most general influence over policy decisions and most power over bureaucrats are not ministers but zoku giin. Theirs, however, is power without responsibility, while the minister bears the responsibility without power. Zoku giin have policy “expertise,” but the policy decisions that concern them tend to focus on such matters as the allocation of construction projects to companies. Finally, zoku giin share a broad range of interests with the bureaucrats in their networks. They are usually aware of persistent policy failures in their respective fields, for example, but have no more interest in making them public than do the bureaucrats themselves.

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